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Abstract
The idea of fiscal decentralisation has become increasingly fashionable world-wide. In some developed
countries the systems of intergovernmental finance have evolved gradually and each country has unique
features. Transition countries on different continents have had differing reasons and motivations for such
reforms. More recently, the acknowledgement of subsidiarity as the basic principle for the European Un-
ion, the introduction of the West German federal system in the eastern part of the country, the revival of
regionalism in European countries are distinctive examples of the decentralisation process in Europe.
Following the equalisation objectives, one tends to argue that those municipalities with greater spending
needs automatically require more financial support from central or upper-level government. Yet, the sum of
grants to municipalities should basically be induced from the comparison of their expenditure needs with
local fiscal capacity from their own resources such as local tax revenues and fees. Surely the expenditure
behaviour of municipalities is also, to a great extent, influenced by their present fiscal capacity and by the size
of local debts. Four European countries were chosen to survey the recent development of local finance: the
UK, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. This paper firstly identifies and highlights the similarities and
differences in municipal finance in an international context. Secondly it theoretically examines the possi-
bility of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local governments through increasing revenues from fees.
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1. Introduction
The idea of decentralisation of political decision-making has become increasingly fash-
ionable world-wide, which is also accompanied by fiscal decentralisation in most cases.
In some developed countries the systems of intergovernmental finance have evolved
gradually and each country has unique features (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero, 1997).
Emerging countries on different continents have had differing reasons and motivations
for such reforms and their consequences for macro-economic stability and growth have
also varied significantly from one country to another (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999).
More recently, the acknowledgement of subsidiarity as the basic principle for the Euro-
pean Union, the introduction of the West German federal system in the eastern part of
the country, the revival of regionalism in Western European countries like Portugal are
distinctive examples of the decentralisation process in Europe. This kind of political
decentralisation has also been pronounced in the transition countries like Poland.
1
Compared to the case for cities and municipalities in western Europe, those located in
the transition countries have been confronted with more serious problems caused by the
speedy industrial modernisation and de-industrialisation, the rapidly increasing public ac-
tivities due to social, economic, health and environmental ills, as well as by the provision
of additional new (city-specific) infrastructure that is often better adapted to newly emerg-
ing economic activities. In particular, the challenges for large cities in eastern Europe have
been more immediate and have also become more intensified in the course of the ongoing
economic and political transition. On the other hand, it is argued that since the large ag-
glomeration areas provide an unparalleled business environment to economic sectors, rural
regions and municipalities are at loss to compete, which, in turn, leads to the increase in
regional disparity in a country. As a result, municipalities in disadvantaged regions suffer
from a net reduction in population size, decreasing local tax revenues, fewer job opportu-
nities etc. Furthermore, cities and municipalities in transition countries seem to be (in some
cases seriously) suffering from a lack of necessary financial means to cover the increasing
expenditures and to meet current challenges. Such fiscal stress usually takes place either
when the costs of providing local services increase faster than revenues needed to finance
them, or when, at given costs of public service provision, local government revenues are
constrained by a declining economic base which reduces taxable resources.
Following the equalisation objectives, one easily tends to argue that those municipalities
and cities with greater spending needs automatically require more financial support from
central or upper-level government. Yet, the sum of grants to municipalities should basically
                                                
1  The advantages of decentralised government system include (1) electors have votes in different politi-
cal levels and thus have more (and better) opportunities to express their preferences, (2) each elected
representative needs to supervise fewer public services and fewer officials and (3) having more tiers3
be induced from the comparison of their (existing and/or anticipated) ‘true’ expenditure
needs with local fiscal capacity from their own resources such as local tax revenues and
fees. To be sure, the expenditure behaviour of municipalities is also, to a great extent, in-
fluenced by their present fiscal capacity as well as by the size of local debts. Most common
types of public activities which are legally assigned to local governments include, for ex-
ample, (1) land planning and local environmental protection, (2) municipal housing and
property management, (3) local transport system, (4) water supply and waste disposal,
(5) primary health care and social welfare services, (6) elementary education, (7) culture
and sport, fire protection, etc. Four European countries were chosen to survey the recent
development of local finance: the UK, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. Germany and
the UK are EU members; Germany is also in the euro zone. Poland is an EU candidate.
Regarding the national constitution the UK is centrally structured, while Switzerland
and Germany are federal states. Poland also guarantees a substantial degree of munici-
pal autonomy but which is limited compared to that of Germany and Switzerland.
Moreover, Poland and (the eastern part of) Germany are transition economies. Among
the selected EU nations and candidates, Germany is the only country currently suffering
from the difficulties of satisfying the Maastricht convergence criteria. Switzerland
would probably be at the Maastricht limits if it were a member. The UK and Poland
presently belong to those European countries with an above-average GDP growth rate,
whereas Switzerland and Germany have recently experienced a rather moderate or low
growth. Due to these different economic, fiscal and institutional characteristics of the
investigated countries one could a priori expect that the local finance system and its
development would differ from one country to another. This paper identifies and high-
lights the similarities and differences in municipal finance in an international context.
Apart from taxation, public debts and intergovernmental fiscal resource allocations
other modes of finance are relevant for the fiscal autonomy of local governments. They
comprise revenues from fees, public enterprise activities, public private partnership,
management of public property, privatisation, shifting of bureaucratic burdens to other
public or private bodies, collecting tributes, concession payments, revenues from sanc-
tions etc. In previous years the issues on fees levied by local governments have not been
adequately investigated in the public finance. Based on the various model approaches
this study additionally highlights the possibility of enhancing fiscal autonomy of mu-
nicipalities through increasing revenues from fees.
                                                                                                                                              
may help electors to evaluate the cost of each tier’s services when the taxes of each tier are perceptible
and relate closely to that tier’s spending (Council of Europe, 1997).4
2. Basic Theoretical Explanations on Fiscal Decentralisation and Mu-
nicipal Finance
The greater sensitivity of sub-central governments to local preferences achieved through
the decentralisation “may enhance the ability of the provider to identify both recipients’
and citizens’ willingness to pay. [...] people will be more willing to pay for [public]
services that they find to be responsive to their priorities, especially if (1) they have
been in the decision-making process and (2) costs are clearly perceptible in the process.
[In other words] decentralisation [would] result in a closer approximation to the effi-
cient solution of provision to the point at which the marginal costs and benefits of pro-
vision are equated” (Darby, Mucastelli and Roy, 2003, p. 14).
Regarding the efficient provision of local utilities, Oates (1972) highlights that public
expenditures should be assigned in a way that provision of public services is made by
the jurisdiction representing the smallest possible area over which the benefits are dis-
tributed. Although some inefficiencies would be expected from a multiplicity of tiers of
governments (like increased administrative complexity, lack of transparency, clashes in
competencies, etc.), the key principle is that the (optimal) size of the subcentral tiers
should be selected to well match the broad range of services provided under the consid-
eration of economies of scale. This fact in turn implies that economies of scale from
joint consumption of public services set a limit to an ever decreasing size of local gov-
ernments. According to Tullock (1969), such a problem can be solved by an external
contracting with large private suppliers or other governments to obtain a service, only if
the service is tangible and its quality and standard are safeguarded.
Moreover theoretical and empirical investigations on fiscal federalism show that a
complete fiscal autonomy can also be disadvantageous and undesirable. First of all, re-
gional and municipal disparities in income and wealth will lead to different levels of tax
revenues in the individual jurisdictions. Consequently, some degrees of resource redis-
tribution are necessary among those sub-central governments to ensure that citizens can
have access to a comparable level (and/or standard) of public service nation-wide. Sec-
ondly, the so-called tax exportation between sub-national jurisdictions can be avoided
when taxes are assigned to different levels of government. For instance, if a substantial
part of local expenditures is coverd by taxes paid by non-residents, local governments
will have an incentive to increase spending beyond efficient levels. Insofar as non-
residents benefit from service provision, then there could be under-provision, a problem
that often arises with large cities and their satellites. Thirdly, the mobility of production
factors accompanied by tax competition imposes limits on fiscal autonomy. For this
reason the most decentralised taxation systems still assign the corporate taxes (on capi-
tal) to central government. Finally, fiscal decentralisation can cause administrative com-5
plexity in tax collection and provision of public utilities (Blankart and Borck, 2003;
Darby, Muscatelli and Roy, 2003).
In the provision of infrastructure, local governments tend to (critically) consider an in-
crease in local taxes, especially when intergovernmental grants to municipalities do not
adequately compensate the existing fiscal stress that is caused by large expenditure needs,
and/or, when the total sum of local debts has already reached the maximum level that
should not be exceeded. In addition, a jurisdiction with well-equipped infrastructure is ob-
viously more attractive for investors and firms looking for a new location, while the in-
crease in local taxes immediately means the loss of regional and municipal competitive-
ness. In the case that the additional provision of infrastructure will mainly be financed by
higher local taxes, local governments should also be well aware of such a trade-off rela-
tionship and their short-term as well as long-term effects on the local economy (Nam,
2000). Based on a similar logic the traditional Tiebout model of revealed preference (1956)
postulates “that [citizens] would choose to locate in jurisdictions that provide them with
the mix of public services [and the local tax burden] that maximise their welfare. [... Those
who] are dissatisfied with the given pattern in their area would [...] move to areas where
the pattern [better corresponds their preferences]. So under certain assumptions, diversity
of provision [of local utilities and tax burden] combined with consumer mobility can lead
to the Pareto-optimal provision [of municipal services]” (Darby, Muscatelli and Roy, 2003,
p. 14).
According to the subsidiarity principle, efficiency in the allocation of financial re-
sources is best achieved by assigning responsibility for each type of expenditure to the
level of government that most closely represents the beneficiaries of provided public
goods and services (Frenkel, 1986; Hyman, 1993; Ter-Minassian, 1997).
2 Compared to
the apparent cases for the central provision of national public goods and services like
macro-economic stabilisation, redistribution, defence and foreign affairs, those activities
related to social protection, education, health and environment have generally been con-
sidered as typical public services which can be well provided by local or regional gov-
ernments. Yet, in most cases public goods have a character of mixed goods, for which
some degree of decentralisation combined with some centralised co-ordination appears
to be feasible and desirable, due to unclear distribution of benefits among regions, ex-
ternalities and spill-overs, etc. As a consequence, overlapping responsibilities in policy
formulation, financing and administration of public goods and services are quite com-
mon, which have also partly contributed to the existing great variety of intergovern-
mental fiscal arrangements and expenditure assignments among different countries
(Levin, 1990; Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero, 1997). Furthermore, the central govern-
ment in many countries can influence the decentralised provision of public goods6
through the regulation of their delivery in terms of quality
3 and the ex-post control of
the use of financial means and transfers.
The strong policy orientation of allocation objectives in terms of the devolution of ex-
penditure responsibilities to local governments can create conflicts with the achievement
of the macro-economic stabilisation and the redistributive goal, which appear to be better
accomplished by the central government (Musgrave, 1983; Oates, 1972). Although “the
overall level of expenditures of [regional or local] governments is effectively constrained
by limits on their taxation and borrowing powers, changes in composition [for example,
in favour of transfers to individuals with a high propensity to consume] may run counter
to the stabilisation objective of the central government” (Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 5). Em-
pirical investigations (including Brosio, 1985) do not always confirm the so-called Le-
viathan hypothesis by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that decentralisation generally limits
the growth of total government expenditures.
4 Furthermore, “with increased decentralisa-
tion comes the possibility of loss of macroeconomic control as local bureaucracies multi-
ply, [which make] monitoring and evaluation more problematic [...]” (Ahmad, Hewitt and
Ruggiero, 1997, p. 31). In a country with large economic disparity among its regions, the
ability of local or regional governments to deliver public goods and services can also vary
widely, which, in turn, could trigger undesirable internal migration. In countries in transi-
tion such type of economic policy conflicts appear to be more adequately taken into ac-
count in making decision about assigning certain expenditure responsibilities to local
governments.
The general principles of decentralisation also guide the assignment of taxes to differ-
ent levels of government. In practice, two options of assigning funds to local jurisdictions
are commonly adopted but quite often in a combined form:
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the central government and financing local ex-
penditure needs by intergovernmental grants or other transfers, for example, in form of
sharing tax revenues, and
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the local governments, if necessary comple-
menting the revenues (raised locally) with tax-sharing arrangements with the central
government (Norregaard, 1997).
Table 1 illustrates more precisely how different types of taxes and grants can be as-
signed to the lower level of governments.
                                                                                                                                              
2  The expenditure assignments involve decisions as to which level of government should be predominantly
responsible for the formulation, financing and administration of policy activities and related follow-ups.
3  This type of concern is particularly strong in areas such as health and education.
4  In the research on the consequences of fiscal decentralisation, some economists also deliver empirical
evidence that public deficit has actually grown in centralised countries than in decentralised ones
(Wrim and van Rompuy, 1990).7






Base and rate under local control
Nation-wide tax base but rates under local control
Nation-wide base and rates, but with a fixed portion of the tax revenues
(on a tax-by-tax basis or on the basis of pool of different tax sources)
being allocated to the local governments in question, based on (1) the
revenues accruing within each jurisdiction (also so-called the derivation
principle) or (2) other criteria, typically population, expenditure needs,
and/or tax capacity.
Local government’s share is fixed by central government (usually with
a re-distributive element), but the former is free to determine how the
grants should be spent; the amounts received by individual authorities
may depend on their tax efforts.
The absolute sum of grant may be determined by central government or
it may be open-ended (i.e. dependent on the expenditure levels decided
by lower levels of government), but in either case central government
specifies the expenditure programmes for which the funds should be
spent.
Source: Norregaard (1997), Tax Assignment, Washington DC.
According to the standard theory of public economics (Oates, 1972; Musgrave and Mus-
grave, 1980; King, 1984), there are several characteristics for typical local taxes, which
financially support a decentralised public expenditure system:
•   The base of local taxes should be neither very mobile nor very unevenly distributed
among jurisdictions. In the case of prevailing strong mobility, taxpayers will relocate
the income activities or tax sources from high to low areas. This fact will also limit the
freedom of local governments to change the rates.
•   Local taxes should be accountable and local taxpayers should know what the tax li-
abilities are. In addition, they should be fairly easy to administer on the local level.
•   The link between payment of the tax and local service received should be intact. In
other words, such benefits should be strongly internalised to the local taxpayers.
•   Local taxes should be able to generate sufficient revenues to avoid large vertical im-
balances and ideally be less sensitive to the changes in business cycle.
In accordance with such criteria mentioned above, land or property taxes and, to some
extent, personal income taxes have been quite often suggested to be suitable local taxes,
while corporate income taxes have usually been considered to be less appropriate for the
same purpose (Paugam, 1999). For example, “[in] some countries, state-level taxation of
corporate profits, in the absence of a coordinated approach, has been accompanied by
strong competition (tax wars), leading to distortions in enterprise’s location decisions, tax
avoidance through transfer pricing by enterprises operating in multiple areas, and erosion
of revenue” (Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 10).8
Intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical imbalance
caused by the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different levels of govern-
ments but also the horizontal imbalance which is led by the different fiscal capacities
among same level jurisdictions. Although the local expenditure needs appear to be hardly
measured in an objective way, the role of transfers becomes more crucial for those deficit
jurisdictions on the sub-national level, especially when their increasing expenditures can-
not be financed by borrowing or they lack direct access to capital markets. In the cases of
existing externalities on other jurisdictions, the central government also needs to finan-
cially support sub-national authorities in order to guarantee the provision of certain public
services on the local level like pollution control, inter-regional highways, etc. (Davis and
Lucker, 1982; Frenkel, 1986; Ali, Lerme and Nakosteen, 1993; Boadway and Hobson,
1993; Hyman, 1993; Rosen, 1995; Dahlby, 1996; Ahmad and Craig, 1997). Furthermore,
the amount of grants should vary with the local expenditure needs and inversely with lo-
cal fiscal capacity, while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More importantly,
an effective transfer system should neither encourage overspending nor weaken tax col-
lection efforts on the sub-national level (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Jones and Cullis, 1994;
Bahl and Linn, 1994; Shah, 1994a and 1994b; Winkler, 1994; Oates, 1998; Nam, Parsche
and Steinherr, 2001).
Basically the re-allocation of fiscal resources from one level of government to another
takes place through the sharing of tax revenues or through a form of grants. In the case of
revenue sharing, tax bases can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis (in some cases with differ-
ent coefficients of distribution among levels of government for each tax), or taxes can be
pooled and shared systematically thereafter, as illustrated in Table 1. According to the
previous experiences in emerging countries, such revenue sharing arrangements appear to
be less successful in encouraging local revenue mobilisation (Fukasaku and de Mello,
1999). Grants from higher (federal or state) to lower levels (state or local) can be condi-
tional (i.e. closely tied with specifications regarding the use of the funds and/or the per-
formance achieved in the supported programme), or unconditional respecting the auton-
omy of local governments in spending such financial means. The so-called block grants
also have a fixed character, which are, however, designed to support broad areas of local
activities (like education, environmental preservation, etc.) rather than specific projects.
On the other hand, intergovernmental grants can be open-ended — regardless of the trans-
fer size required to cover the expenditure needs of individual local governments — or
subject to certain limits. In addition, the down-flow grants have been quite often made in
the EU on the basis of the so-called additionality principle, which requires — as a eligi-
bility criterion for the supporting grants — the partial financial participation of local gov-
ernments in providing local goods and services in its territory.
In many countries municipal fees have recently been increased considerably, which
have led to an expansion of local revenues from this item. As long as profits were9
yielded, municipal autonomy has been widened. However, higher fee revenues that stem
from higher sales on the basis of given fees require a large scale production. In countries
like Germany there are laws that stipulate cost coverage of local firms but do not allow
profit-making. Therefore, an increase in fees only temporarily eases fiscal stress. More
benefits may result from transferring municipalities’ rights to private economic units
against concession payments. Such rights include rights to provide energy, to organise
passenger traffic, to use the municipal territory for storage, to organise markets, to use
urban land for manufacturing, housing, gas lines, electricity and communication infra-
structure (Friedrich, Gwiazda and Nam, 2003).
In addition “concerns over the distortionary effects of tax financing, fairness and a
wish to make costs more perceptible to consumers are all factors that potentially support
increases in the scope of user charges. [In particular, OECD] has been critical of low
reliance on user charges by various [member] countries in the areas of child care, care
of elderly and pharmaceuticals. Trends in these areas suggest that take-up of free serv-
ices is booming and supply-side rationing is considerable. The provision of services free
of charge, or without making costs perceptible, obviously risks prompting excessive
demand and hitting supply constraints, because the social costs of supply are largely
irrelevant for the individual. User charges offer the potential to gain more information
about price sensitivity of demand for services and can potentially render demand pres-
sure directly influential rather than being expressed indirectly and imperfectly through
the electoral system. Demand pressures may also be influential on supply-side effi-
ciency. However user charging will be viable only if the costs of collection and of com-
pensation through the benefit system are low relative to the sums that can be levied and
the efficiency gains that result. Countries that have tried to increase reliance on fees and
charges have generally aimed at strike a balance between copayment and maximum
contribution to avoid imposing unduly high expenses on some households” (Darby,
Muscatelli and Roy, 2003, p. 29).
Borrowing has traditionally been an important source to finance long-term public infra-
structure projects in advanced countries because it enhances intergenerational equity. In
other words, these projects yield returns through several generations, over which the costs
for the provision of public goods should be shared equally. Such type of intergenerational
burden sharing enables small local governments to undertake the necessary large scale
infrastructure investments (Shah, 1999). However, some countries still impose strict re-
strictions on local borrowing. For example, in some developing and transition countries
large infrastructure projects have recently been more strongly supported in terms of capi-
tal grants or on-lending from higher level governments, since local governments (espe-
cially in the small entities due to their weak economic power, small size of tax income
and other unfavourable creditworthiness) quite often suffer from the lack of direct access
to credit markets.10
More importantly, fiscal deficits and debt have continuously risen over time in a large
number of countries both at the state and local levels. The rapid growth of local public
debt in a country, which eventually endangers the macro-economic stability, also imme-
diately questions whether the local borrowing is tightly oriented to the necessary financial
needs for well-designed local public projects and whether its process is transparent and
efficient enough in an administrative sense.
5 In general there are four basic debt-control
categories which are applied in practice in combined forms:
•   primary reliance on market discipline without the so-called bail-out guarantee of the
central government when the credit market is free and transparent information prevails
(Lane, 1993),
•   a dialogue-oriented co-operation and negotiation among different levels of govern-
ments in the design and implementation of debt controls (including limits on the in-
debtedness of sub-national governments),
•   rules-based controls as specified in the constitution or by law regarding, for example,
setting purpose- or project-oriented limits on the absolute level of local debts, and
•   direct administrative controls of the central government over local borrowing, includ-
ing setting of annual limits on the overall debt of individual sub-national jurisdictions
6,
the tight review and authorisation of individual borrowing operations like credit ap-
provals (or the centralisation of all government borrowing) and ex-post monitoring,
etc. (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997; Shah, 1999; Council of
Europe, 2000).
7
All these controls can also be classified into passive and active controls, as illustrated
in Table 2.
                                                
5  “[In Poland] the 1998 Law on Public Finance imposes certain restrictions on local and regional budget
deficit. ... When the national public deficit is between 50% and 55% of the GDP, the [sub-national]
authorities may not increase their budgetary deficit [in relation to the prior year. When the same ratio
ranges] between 55% and 60%, local and regional governments must lower their deficit to an amount
which varies proportionally from 100% of the previous year’s deficit (when the ratio public defi-
cit/GDP is 55%) to nil (when the ratio is 60%). No public deficit is allowed and no new guarantee may
be granted when national public debt exceeds 60% of the GDP” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 23).
6  This is the case in Denmark, for example.
7  In the UK basic approvals for borrowings of individual municipalities are made on the basis of their
general need to spend on capital and their usable capital receipts. Specific credit approvals are issued
in response to a specific requirement and purpose. Local governments are not allowed to take credit
for financing current expenditures. In Poland total local and regional government debt and loan re-
payment (principal and interest) must not exceed 60% and 15% of the authority’s annual income re-
spectively (Council of Europe, 2000).11
Table 2 Active and passive controls over local borrowings
Passive controls These types of local debt controls have many forms, from broad guidelines on
allowable ranges of debt/revenue and debt charges/own-source revenue ratios,
to more specific golden rules, which permit borrowing only for capital forma-
tion but forbid it for financing current deficits.
Active controls More active controls on local borrowing include centrally specified limits on
capital spending of each local government, central government approval of
submitted local project and local debts (including bond finance) and seeking
community mandates on borrowing plans through popular referenda.
Sources: Shah (1999), Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Governance: for Better or for Worse?, OECD,
Paris; Spahn (1999), Decentralization, Local Government Capacity and Creditworthiness: Macroeconomic
Aspects, World Bank, Washington DC.
3. Comparison of Municipal Finance in the Selected European
Countries
Because of their different economic, fiscal and institutional characteristics the UK,
Germany, Poland and Switzerland are chosen to survey the development of municipal
finance. As already mentioned, Germany and the UK are EU members – the former is
also in the euro zone – and since May 2004 Poland is also an EU member. Switzerland
and Germany are federal states, while the UK is centrally structured. Compared to Ger-
many and Switzerland the municipal autonomy guaranteed in Poland is limited. Moreo-
ver, Poland and (the eastern part of) Germany are transition economies. Germany is the
only country currently suffering from the difficulties of satisfying the Stability and
Growth Pact among the selected EU nations. Switzerland would probably be at the lim-
its of the Maastricht convergence criteria if it were an EU member. There is an apparent
difference concerning the GDP growth rate of Germany/Switzerland and the
UK/Poland: While the latter group of countries recently experienced an above-average
growth rate, the growth rate of the former two countries was moderate or low. Further-
more the number of native inhabitants of European origin is gradually shrinking in
Germany and the UK, whereas the size of the Swiss population has remained rather
stable. At the present this is not an important issue in Poland.12
3.1 Development of Municipal Revenues
According to figure 1 one can state that there is a clear difference concerning the struc-
ture of municipal revenues of Germany, Switzerland, England
8 and Poland.
9 The activi-
ties of Swiss municipalities are mostly financed by taxes, whereas for Germany, Eng-
land and Poland grants are by far the most important source of revenues with a share of
over 50% in the former, 45% in England and even 64% in the latter. Tax revenues cover
only 35% of municipal finance in Germany, 31% in England and less than 19% in Po-
land compared to 46% in Switzerland. Compared to Germany, England and Poland fees
and charges are of more significant relevance for Swiss municipalities with a share of
almost 25%. This very general pattern of municipal revenues for the four states can not
only be found for the year 2000 or 2002, but holds true for the 1990s, that will be shown
among other things in this chapter. Similar in all four countries is the fact that revenues
from grants and transfers gained in importance in the 10-year periods studied whereas
revenues from taxes have lost – except in Poland where the share of tax revenues stayed
constant – in importance.
                                                
8 We will restrict our discussion on the development of municipal revenues and expenditures in England
because dates for the UK weren’t available.
9  In Germany the central government (Federal Government, Bund), the 16 state governments (Länder)
and the local governments consisting of 13837 municipalities (Gemeinden, towns), 440 cities (117
kreisfreie Städte) and 323 counties (Kreise) make up the existing government bodies. In Switzerland
government entities consist of the central government (federal government or Bund), 26 state govern-
ments (cantons) and local governments of which 2880 are municipalities (Gemeinden, towns). Fur-
thermore, cantons are divided by 176 districts. There are some cantons like Uri, Zug and Appenzell
which have no districts. In contrast to the case in Germany the existence of Swiss municipalities is not
guaranteed in the constitutions of the federal government and cantons. Nonetheless, there exists un-
written law regarding their autonomy, although they are legally functioning as an enforcement agency
to cantons.13
Figure 1: Structure of municipal revenues













* For Poland and the UK grants/transfers also include revenues from tax sharing.
Source: ifo Institute
Local revenues increased in all four countries over the investigated period: In Germany
they increased from about € 100 billion in 1991 to € 145 billion in 1995, what reflects
the unification boom in the municipalities of the former GDR.
10 After a drop to € 141
billion in 1997 due to a reduction of current grants, local revenues increased to € 148
billion in 2000. Tax revenues increased – except of slight business cycle fluctuations –
until 2000, because of the participation of (west German) municipalities in income
taxation and to the local business tax, i.e. a tax on profit.
11 Moreover, German munici-
palities have increased the property and business tax rates. Reason for increasing total
revenues in the years from 1997 to 2000 can be seen in the booming economy which led
to additional tax receipts. In Switzerland municipal revenues also gradually increased
from Sfr 30 billion in 1990 to Sfr 44 billion in 2000.
12 Furthermore tax revenues, which
represent the main source of revenues as mentioned before, continued to rise until 2000
with exception of 1997. However, the share of these revenues reduced over the years
from 49% to 46% because fees and charges gain in importance. For England one can
find an increase of total revenues of over 65% in the period from 1990/91 to
2001/2002:
13 They augmented from about ₤ 59 billion to nearly ₤ 98 billion. As in
Switzerland tax revenues increased in England from ₤ 23 billion in 1990/91 to ₤ 31 in
2001/2002 with a decrease of their share. The reason for that can be seen in the pattern
                                                
10  All figures about municipal revenues in Germany can be found in Table a1 in Annex.
11  In east Germany tax revenues maintained a share of only 5 % of total municipal revenues, whereas
this figure amounted to nearly 30 % for municipalities in the West.
12  All figures concerning revenues of Swiss municipalities can be found in Table a2 in Annex.
13  All figures about municipal revenues in England can be found in Table a3 in Annex.14
of the revenues from intergovernmental grants and transfers which doubled. While total
revenues of municipalities in Poland did amount only Zlotys 6 billion in 1992 they sub-
stantially increased until 2002 to more than Zlotys 38 billion.
14 This corresponds to a
six-fold expansion in ten years, for which the reason is nothing else than the transfor-
mation process from a communistic state towards political decentralization what finally
leads to an EU membership since this year.
As already mentioned German municipalities are extremely dependent on intergov-
ernmental grants, which primarily serve to finance current expenditures in the fields of
education, culture, social welfare, health, municipal public facilities and municipal firms
and also partly assist in debt servicing and investment financing for local infrastructure
projects.
15 They gained about 65% from 1991 (€ 46 billion) to 2000 (€ 76 billion), with
a peak in 1995 where they amounted € 78 billion or nearly 54% of total revenues. In the
following two years intergovernmental grants declined, because expenses in social wel-
fare were reduced.
16 But since 1999 they started to rise again and in 2000 grants reached
a share of 51% of total revenues. This was a result of the good economic development
at the end of the 1990s which led to increasing payments from higher tiers of govern-
ment to the municipalities (kommunaler Finanzausgleich). Intergovernmental grants
and transfers are also of great importance for the municipalities in England and Poland.
In England they doubled in the period from 1990/91 (₤ 21 billion) to 2001/2002 (₤ 44
billion) and reach now a share of 45% of total revenues. This process was forced by the
aim to decentralize the country and making each municipality more economically com-
petitive. As the political responsibility of municipal governments has not been met with
equivalent financial authority the payment of grants has been the only way to reach this.
Same reason holds for Polish gminas (communes). Because of the communistic regime
in the preceding decades only grants and transfers have been an instrument to finance
the necessary development of rural areas and reaching the goal of fiscal decentraliza-
tion. So Poland witnessed an increase of the share of grants and transfers from 53% in
1992 to 64% in 2002. Although grants from central government and the respective can-
tons to municipalities in Switzerland also grew considerably in the 1990s, namely about
61%, there is a clear difference to Germany, England and Poland: Swiss municipalities
                                                
14  All figures concerning revenues of Polish municipalities can be found in Table a4 in Annex.
15  Investments grants remained relatively stable although the relation between current and investment
grants has changed continuously in the western municipalities in favour of the former type. In the east-
ern part of Germany over 50% of all local revenues were based on grants due to lagging tax revenues.
During the transformation process investment grants continually played an important role. Due to the
reduction of expenses for services and the respective number of staff, outsourcing of services, privati-
sation, etc., current grants did not grow strongly in general.
16  This is the consequence of new regulations related to asylum seekers, health care for the elderly peo-
ple, further outsourcing and service reductions, changes in legal forms of public facility activities and
reduction in local investments.15
are not easily as much dependent on them, and in 2000 only about 15% of total reve-
nues attributed to grants.
More clearly the dependence on grants can be seen in figure 2 which illustrates the
development of the share of own revenues over expenditures from 1990 to 2002 for the
four countries. Important is the fact that own municipal revenues exclude grants and so
the dependence of local authorities on grants is shown in figure 2.






















































Whereas for Swiss municipalities there is only a weak dependence on payments of
higher tiers of government which is decreasing since 1998, German, English and Polish
local authorities apparently are financed through allowances and this dependence on
grants is increasing again. One reason for the huge amount of grants for German mu-
nicipalities in the 1990s might be the transformation process of the former GDR. There-
fore one could expect a sharp change concerning the extent of grant payments in the
coming years, because the transformation process will be ‘completed’. But this will not
happen, because German municipalities are entitled by law to receive financial re-
sources (tax revenues and grants) for their tasks from the state government. High grant
payments are a typical consequence of this and so local authorities in Germany aren’t
fiscally spoken very autonomous. In contrast the administrative and fiscal activities of
Swiss cantons and municipalities are closely interwoven and the terms ‘joint execution’
and ‘joint responsibility’ are often used. This intensive horizontal cooperation at canto-16
nal and communal level is permitted by the federal and cantonal Constitutions (Dafflon
1999). Thus grant payments do not play a major role in Switzerland.
The reason for the strong dependence of Polish municipalities on grants in the 1990s
can be seen – as already mentioned – in the transformation process from a socialistic to
a democratic state. This includes not only the privatization process of state owned firms
but also the fiscal decentralization of the country. This process will sooner or later come
to an end. At the same time this won’t mean that the municipalities will be less depend-
ent on grant payments, because this can only be achieved if polish municipalities get
more financial authority. Furthermore figure 2 shows that municipalities in England
have been strongest dependent on grant payments in the 1990s what reflects the domi-
nant role of the central government for the local finance matters. There is no sign that
there will be a change in the future and therefore grant payments won’t loose their
dominant role in English municipalities.
Regarding the development of municipal revenues from fees (other current receipts)
for Germany it is obvious that they are decreasing since 1995 and in 2000 they almost
reached the level of 1992. This decrease can be attributed to the budget consolidation of
western and eastern German municipalities which led to a reduction of personnel costs,
the outsourcing of local activities, the establishment of municipal firms as well as the
closing down of institutions and privatization. Contrary to Germany revenues from fees
increased about 65% in Switzerland in the last decade. Current costs such as staff costs,
material costs, interests or depreciation allowances increased and so Swiss municipali-
ties were forced to charge higher fees because they encountered difficulties in raising
tax rates. In the way fees gained in importance in the last years tax revenues were losing
it in Switzerland. A similar growth path concerning revenues from fees may be possible
in German municipalities: On the one hand municipal expenditures will grow in the
future – they already did in the last decade as will be shown below – and on the other
hand there exits the same difficulties to raise tax rates in Germany. Therefore munici-
palities in Germany will be forced to act like their Swiss neighbors and increase fees to
cover the expenditures.
17 Same may arise in Poland where the share of fees and charges
decreased to less than 2% in the studied period. The transformation process accompa-
nied by privatization and the closure of several institutions did cause the reduction of
the share of fees and charges in Polish gminas. As there is not much scope to enlarge
grant payments and tax increases aren’t additionally enforceable regarding the increas-
ing tax competition in a further growing EU, only fees and charges can be used to cover
the growing municipal expenditures in the future in Poland. The pattern of revenues
from fees and charges in municipalities in England confirms this assumption: Whereas
                                                
17 The current discussion about a reform of the German tax system whose purpose it is to simplify the
existing fiscal system accompanied by decreasing tax rates for every income group strengthen this ar-
gument.17
the share of fees and charges on total revenues decreased about two percentage points
from 21% to 19% due to the above average increase of grant payments, the total
amount increased of about 50% from 1990/91 to 2001/02. Reason for this may be seen
in the growing municipal expenditures, which were in the last decade mainly covered by
grants. As there is a limit for grant payments since higher tiers of government have to
stabilise their finances because of the compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact
only fees (and charges) can be used to achieve more local income.
Because of the transfer of legally dependent local facilities to public firms and poli-
cies which aimed at consolidating municipal firms there was an increase concerning the
revenues from enterprise in Germany in the 1990s. Those revenues from business per-
formance of municipal firms amounted € 7.9 billion in 1999 – in 2000 there was a small
decrease of 2.4%. In the eastern part of Germany municipal firms were newly estab-
lished during the last decade and losses have been reduced. But there also was an active
privatization process of firms making not only profits but also losses,
18 what may be the
reason for the decreasing revenues in 2000. Influenced by these privatization and budget
consolidation policies municipal revenues from the sale of property peaked in 1996 with
€ 6.5 billion. Until 2000 those revenues declined – an ongoing process. As well as in
Germany revenues from business performance of municipal firms and the sale of prop-
erty increased in Switzerland, namely from Sfr. 1.9 billion in 1990 to Sfr. 3.0 billion in
2000. However, compared to Germany, this is to a lesser extent partly due to the trans-
fer of municipal facilities to public firms and the increasing prices for public services to
consolidate local firms. Furthermore these revenues with a share of 6.9% of total reve-
nues at the most contributed to a lesser extent to the increase in municipal revenues than
in Germany, where they amounted 15.5% of total revenues in 2000, for instance.
19
Net new debts of German municipalities, which borrowed both from capital markets
and from other public institutions, reached their maximum in 1992 with € 0.66 billion
and compared to the previous year that corresponds to an increase of about 127%. This
sharp increase in 1992 may be a consequence of the downturn and the fact, that East
German municipalities were particularly forced to take large scale credits between 1991
and 1993. After 1992 net crediting dissipated because of budget consolidation policies
and transfers of public debt to municipal firms, so that in 2000 net new debt reached a
level of about € 0.4 billion. It should be stressed that rather strict regulations of munici-
pal debt has linked local investment with the fiscal capacities of municipalities. Also an
important determinant of municipal debt has been a mixed funding of public programs
                                                
18 European competition policies have gradually reduced the profits of municipal firms, especially in the
energy sector where charges for concessions to use the municipal territories by energy firms came un-
der pressure.
19  There are no comparable dates about revenues from enterprise and from sale of property for munici-
palities in England and Poland available.18
in which municipalities share the financial burden with the federal and state govern-
ment.
In English municipalities revenues from bank credits and municipal bonds peaked in
2000/2001 with ₤ 1.9 billion, but their share never was larger than 2.2% of total local
authority income. This reflects the restrictive credit policy: As municipalities in England
aren’t financial autonomous they aren’t inevitably allowed to use a credit and the obli-
gation of municipal bonds to finance themselves.
20
To summarize the development of municipal revenues in the four studied countries
one can state, that there is a prevailing difference concerning the structure of municipal
income not only between all four countries but also between the two federal states Ger-
many and Switzerland and the two more or less centrally structured countries England
and Poland
21. Whereas tax revenues are the most important source of income in Swit-
zerland followed by fees and charges, grants do play a major role in municipalities of
Germany, England and Poland, but with different shares (see figure 1). At the same time
tax revenues are more important in Germany than in England and of less relevance in
Poland. The share of fees and charges only increased in Switzerland in the last decade.
In Poland they are only on the fringes. For the future one should notice a change con-
cerning the importance of revenues from fees and charges in Germany, England and
Poland: To cover the further increasing municipal expenditures their share will increase
as already happened in Switzerland. That municipal expenditures already increased in
the last decade will be shown in the next chapter.
3.2  Development of Municipal Expenditures
Overall one can find for all four countries an increase of total municipal expenditures in
the 1990s: Whereas they gained about 23% in Germany and 34% in Switzerland, there
was a strong increase in England with 64% and above all in Poland, where the transfor-
mation process caused a sixfold of total municipal expenditures.
In Germany total expenditures increased from about € 134 billion in 1991 to € 165
billion in 2000 with a strong increase until the mid-1990s.
22 Afterwards they slightly
declined and started to rise again after 1997. This development can mainly be attributed
to the transformation process of the former GDR, which required investments in differ-
ent sectors. Especially social aid – the largest category of expenditure in Germany –in-
creased about 46% in Germany until 1995. New federal laws, which directed insurance
agencies to care for the elderly placed limits on social aid and reduced nursing fees, led
                                                
20  For Switzerland and Poland no comparable data about net new debt or bank credits is available.
21  Poland can be classified as a kind of centralized country because of the limited autonomy guaranteed
to their municipalities.
22  All figures about municipal expenditures in Germany can be found in Table a5 in Annex.19
to a decrease of social welfare expenditures in the following years. But since 1999 they
again started to rise and reached a share of about 27% of total municipal expenditures in
2000. Reason for this can be seen in the structure of the social system in Germany. To
prevent an ongoing increase of these expenditures in the future because of the demo-
graphic changes reforms have to take place as soon as possible. Otherwise the share of
social aid on total municipal expenditures will further grow and German municipalities
will need more financial resources – like fees – to cover these expenses. In Switzerland
municipal expenditures gradually increased from Sfr 30 billion in 1990 to Sfr 41 billion
in 2000.
23 Only in 1997 there was a slight reduction. In the same time expenditures for
social welfare gained about 79%, but only have a share of 15% of total municipal ex-
penditures. But together with expenditures for health care which increased from Sfr 5
billion to over Sfr 7 billion in 2000 the share is 33%. Compared to Germany and Swit-
zerland total expenditures increased even more in England from ₤ 60 billion in 1990/91
to ₤ 98 billion in 2001/02.
24 This is mainly caused by growing expenditures for personal
social services which increased about 176% in the studied period. As in Switzerland the
share of these expenditures is by far not as high as in Germany, but reached only 16% in
2001/2002. Outstanding is the development of municipal expenditures in Poland:
Whereas they amounted Zlotys 6.5 billion in 1992 they nearly reached Zlotys 40 billion
ten years later.
25 This increase reflects nothing else than the transformation process.
After decades of a communistic regime Polish gminas were underdeveloped and in-
vestments were needed to build up infrastructure of all kind. Concerning expenditures
for health care and social welfare one can observe an increase of their share until 1995.
After that this share declined except of some fluctuations and in 2002 the share of ex-
penditures for health care and welfare amounted 14% of total municipal expenditures.
Thus a change in the social system took place during the transformation process but not
such a huge social system as practiced in Germany was adopted. Regarding the forth-
coming problems in this sector this can be a comparative advantage sooner or later.
Equal for Switzerland, England and Poland is the fact that not expenditures for social
welfare are the largest category but expenditures for education with a share of 23% in
the former, 32% in England and even 42% in the latter in the last studied period for each
country. In fact there was an increase of those expenditures in Germany in the 1990s of
about 9% but the share of expenditures for schooling still amounts less then 10%. Ex-
penditures for education increased nearly 40% in Switzerland and 50% in England in
the same time period. This strong increase in both countries doesn’t reflect an underde-
veloped education system as it did exist in Poland after the socialistic era, but shows
                                                
23  All figures concerning municipal expenditures in Switzerland can be found in Table a6 in Annex.
24  All figures concerning municipal expenditures in England can be found in Table a7 in Annex.
25  All figures about municipal expenditures in Poland can be found in Table a8 in Annex.20
that Switzerland and England attach importance on the improvement of schooling and
education. This should be used as a sign for Germany.
Staff expenses peaked in Germany in 1995, declined in the following years and
started to increase again since 1997. In 2000 they amounted € 14 billion and 8.5% of
total municipal expenditures. In Switzerland staff expenditures also increased gradually
about 19% in the 1990s and had a share of 8.4% in 2000. The share of municipal ex-
penditures for public administration is highest in Poland with nearly 14%.
After 1992 expenses for construction, housing and traffic decreased in Germany but
started to increase since 1998. They have a share of 12% of total expenditures compared
to 7% in Switzerland, where we can find a comparable development regarding the
spending for housing and traffic. A similar development took place for expenditures for
municipal firms and real estate funds in Germany: They increased until 1992 and then
after a slight downfall started to increase again after 1998. In England expenditures for
transport and housing increased from 1990/91 to 2001/02 with some fluctuations con-
cerning the expenses for transport. Together they have a share of 21.2%. Expenditures
for transport and telecommunication services experienced in Poland as the expenditures
for education and outstanding increase from a share of total expenditures of 2% to 11%
in ten years. This again reflects the necessary investment activities in Polish munici-
palities after the communistic regime.
Important municipal expenditures in Germany are also expenses for public facilities
and business promotion with a share of 10% in 2000. As a consequence of the transfor-
mation process of the former GDR they increased until 1992 and then started to de-
crease. Expenditures for general finance increased 71% in Germany during the 1990s
and reached a share of nearly 17% of total municipal expenditures. In Switzerland this
share is only 7%. In Switzerland an England municipal expenditures for environment
and regional planning increased and have a share of 8.7% and 8.4% of total expendi-
tures. Interesting is the development of expenditures for communal economy in Poland:
Their share increased until 1993 to 31% and then decreased to 10% in 2002 what may
also be a result of the transformation process.
From this comparison one can state that municipal expenditures did increase in all
four studied countries in the last decade. But there are differences concerning the sig-
nificance of expenditure assets: In Germany expenses for social service are most im-
portant, whereas in Switzerland, England and Poland expenses for education are high-
est. In Switzerland social welfare together with health care has with 33% a higher share
than in Germany with 27% for social welfare. For both countries this reflects a distinc-
tive social system which has to be reformed in the coming years. Otherwise municipal
expenditures will further increase and this may not be financed any more.21
4.  The Role of Fees for Municipal Finance
Apart from taxation, public debts and intergovernmental fiscal resource allocations
other modes of finance are relevant for the fiscal autonomy of  sub-states or municipali-
ties as well as central government. They comprise revenues from fees, public enterprise
activities, public private partnership, management of public property, privatisation,
shifting of bureaucratic burdens to other public or private bodies, collecting tributes,
concession payments, revenues from sanctions etc. In previous years the issues on fees
levied by local governments have not been adequately investigated in the public fi-
nance.
Yet there are some academic discussions on the principles of fixing fees (Bird, 1976;
Seldon, 1977; Bohley 1980; Grossekettler, 1985; Wagner, 1991; Sackofsky and
Wieland, 2000). There are normative aspects related to the ways how to formulate fees
to increase welfare. According to a welfare function the social marginal benefit of a
public service should be equal to the marginal social costs of the same service. The so-
cial marginal benefits in terms of willingness to pay for the service has to be equal to
the marginal willingness to pay against the provision of the service, if the social net
benefit concept is adopted instead of a welfare function. Such different types of willing-
ness can be reflected in consumer surplus, sales, monetary terms for advantageous ex-
ternal effects minus a producer surplus, costs and  monetary  terms for disadvantageous
external effects. If the welfare expression is restricted to consumer surplus and sales
subtracted by the related costs, the marginal cost pricing principle applies for fixing
fees. With increasing marginal costs in a monopoly the amount of fee appears to be de-
sirable which satisfies the condition that the fee per service unit is same as the marginal
costs and also allows profits (Oort, 1961; Lösenbeck, 1965; Nelson, 1964; Thiemeyer
1964; Thiemeyer, 1970, Krelle 1976; Bös 1981): in this case rules for application of
peak load pricing possible (Turvey, 1968; Bätz, 1979; Blankart, 1980; Bös, 1981; Wirl
1991). Sometimes institutional framework, organisational and legal forms require a bal-
anced budget for the public institution providing the service. In cases with the falling
marginal costs marginal cost prices lead to losses and budget problems occur. For that
purpose the so-called Ramsey-pricing (Ramsey, 1927, Bös 1986), the Feldstein-prices
considering cost coverage (Wirl, 1991) and the peage systems (Allais, 1984; Hutter,
1950; Boiteux, 1951) were developed for determining fees. In terms of cost effective-
ness analysis fees are set to cover the cost required maximal output (Friedrich, 1969;
Krelle, 1976). In the utility analysis fees are determined under the consideration of sales
and concession (Friedrich, 1969), maximisation of employment (Hansmeyer and Fürst,
1968; Bös, 1986), regional goals (Thiemeyer, 1975), vote maximisation (Blankart,
1980; Ziemes, 1992). The so-called commercial-pricing offers pricing rules that can22
also be welfare-oriented as well (Shepherd, 1965; Friedrich, 1969). However, these
principles do not consider whether the formation of fees is related to central govern-
ment, state or municipal government.
The conventional welfare-oriented literature on fees mainly considers the welfare
maximisation of the central government for the entire nation taking into account the
willingness to pay presented by all the citizens (Friedrich, 1971). The welfare of a
member state in a federation or a municipality can not be easily detected through the
net-benefit approach, since prices do not only reflect the willingness to pay of people in
the state or municipality under consideration. For instance, consumer surplus, turnover,
producer surplus, etc. show the judgements of non-state or non-municipal residence,
commuters and people abroad too. The benefit-cost analysis oriented to the isolated
welfare maximisation of a sub-state or a municipality affords many changes of evalua-
tion in money terms. Sales, consumer surpluses, costs etc. have to be redefined and spe-
cial deferrals have to be made. Sales to non-residents may be interpreted as exports and
procurements from non-residential citizens and economic units as imports. A willing-
ness-to-use indicator of export surpluses, taxes from other residence etc. may be devel-
oped. Many more changes have to be introduced in the evaluation schemes (Friedrich,
1971). When determining the optimal size of a fee quite different marginal costs and
marginal benefits emerge and marginal cost pricing produces other values to the average
fee equated to the state or municipal relevant costs. Therefore, the welfare-oriented fee
determination does not deliver satisfactory guidelines to find the optimal sum of fees.
Moreover for determination of fees researchers assume monopolistic market forms
for the supply of municipal services. This is true in some exceptional cases like a mar-
riage license bureau. However one finds quite often oligopolies such as convention
halls, theatres, swimming pools, municipal garbage plants, municipal or public banks, or
oligopsonies like business promotion agencies. With some fees there is monopolistic
competition or there are  nearly polypolies, for example, if schools can be chosen by
parents. Marginal cost pricing is also mainly related to the oligopolies (Friedrich, 1978).
Often other parameters of action such as service times are not considered in welfare-
oriented approaches (Friedrich,1978). For the formation of fees the whole bunch of in-
struments of sales and production management should be considered. Therefore wel-
fare-oriented fee determination does not deliver satisfactory guidelines to find the opti-
mal level.
Fee collecting public institutions such as administrative units and public enterprises
can have many organisational forms of public and private laws which also prescribe
different regulations for the formation of fees. Therefore, there are actually very differ-
ent pricing policies allowed, which ranges from acceptable (not maximal) profits for
public enterprises to substantial losses (Brede, 1998) in order to promote the receipt of
services (theatres, etc.). Moreover, fee collecting public economic units and their pric-23
ing policies are used as instruments for economic policy making (Oettle, 1998) or as
instrument for promoting regional competition (Friedrich and Feng, 2000). Municipali-
ties also can try to create profits and receipts to consolidate their budget in the frame-
work of legal possibilities or the may follow political aims such as winning votes
(Thiemeyer, 1975). Therefore a bundle of different goals may underlay the formation of
fees.
A municipality may establish a municipal enterprise of public or private law to pro-
vide services. Then the municipality may try to receive gain from the public enterprise
in the framework of legal possibilities. If it is in the form of public law, legal require-
ments for cost coverage exist (Zwehl, 1991, Gawel, 1995; Gottschalk, 1998; Siekmann,
1998; Tettinger, 1998, Färber, 2000). However, due to the autonomy to shape the cost
accounting scheme and the consideration of costs leading not to financial outflows like
imputed cost for depreciation, for non-realised risks, wages for entrepreneurial man-
agement, etc. and the application of different cost assessment and distribution methods,
fiscal receipts can be gained (Bolsenkötter, 1998; Friedrich, 1998). Although municipal
firms of private law underlies cost coverage pricing requirements (Tettinger, 1998),
their legal possibilities for achieving profits are larger. Therefore fees can be determined
by special principal-agent relations as well.
Nowadays the private public partnership is developed especially on the local level.
Here many legal solutions seem to be possible (Gottschalk, 1998). Fees can be collected
by a municipality, whereas production and distribution of services may be organised by
a private enterprise selling its services to the municipality. In this case the level of fees
strongly depends on the type of contract made between the local government and the
private firm, and higher or lower costs occurring with the private firm as well as the
legal requirements including laws related to public procurement and the price setting
between the municipality and the private firm.
In order to restrict a number of objectives to be achieved when fixing fees require-
ments are legally suggested with respect to the principles of fee formation. In Poland
and Germany the benefit principle is applied in the form of cost coverage requirements
(Borodo, 2003; Bohley, 2004). In Germany similar state laws exist which regulate the
fee determination of municipalities (Siekmann,1998; Tettinger, 1998). In Switzerland it
is up to individual regulations of the cantons regarding the ways how municipalities
charge municipal services. In United Kingdom there are many different regulations with
respect to charging for public services. Whether normatively based user-charge policies
improve the fiscal situation of municipalities depends on whether loss avoidance or
profits are possible or probable. To examine this possibility a positive theory for fee
levying administrative units and public enterprises must be developed.24
4.1   Positive Theories of Fees
Public administrative units (public office) charging fees attempt to achieve public
goals by providing goods and services for other economic units (e.g. businesses and
consumers). It possesses the long-term stock of production factors and its management
should be competent regarding to essential decisions related to the production and de-
livery. Public offices comprise legally dependent institutions fully integrated into
budget planning. Fees are normally not for direct disposal of such an administrative
unit.
A  public firm is separated from the owner’s budget planning (Eichhorn and
Friedrich 1976). Such a firm shows some similar characteristics of a private firm, since
they are also are oriented to sales and markets (Friedrich, 1969; Rees 1976; Turvey,
1971; Thiemeyer, 1975; Blankart, 1980; Bös, 1981; Püttner, 1985; Eichorn, 1991;
Friedrich, 1992; Mühlenkamp, 1994). On the other hand it is obliged to achieve public
goals, which are fixed by an owner, by a regulatory agency or by law or which are de-
termined within the decision making units of the public enterprise. Some public enter-
prises underlie special fee regulations by state and national laws or the pricing policy
guidelines of the firm owners.
A simple model of a public firm serves as a basis for a theory of public firms and
allows integrating many aspects of fee policies into the model. The following model of
a public firm comprises (Friedrich, 1988; Friedrich, 1992; Friedrich and Feng, 2000):
•   A utility (goal) function U of the public firm's management shows management
utility depending on output X and labour input L.
(1) UU ( X , L ) = , X
' U/ X U ∂∂ = , L
' U/ L U ∂∂ =
•   A restriction concerning the production function. There is one fixed factor A and
two variable factors of production, L = labour and C = materials).
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•   A demand function shows the dependency between price P and volume X of output
sold25
 (3)  PP ( X ) = , P/ X P' 0 ∂∂=<
•   The costs function demonstrates fixed costs KA and two types of variable costs. The
factor price of labour is w and that of materials is i.
(4) A KK w Li C =+ ⋅ + ⋅
•   A restriction, which turnover is same as costs, is introduced. We assume self-
financing of the public firm.
(5)  A P(X) X K w L i C ⋅= +⋅+ ⋅
•   Maximisation of utility of management under the restrictions mentioned leads to the
following LaGrange formulation:
(6)  A U(X,L) (P X K w L i C) Λ= +λ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ , while XA f ( L , C ) =⋅
The following first order conditions of maximisation are delivered,
(7) A P(X) X K w L i C 0
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which yield two optimality conditions. One concerns the equivalence of the relation of
marginal utilities of marginal factor inputs to the proportion of respective marginal
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Corresponding to the various utility functions different cost curves emerge. An output
maximising public firm shows the curves of minimal costs. If output and labour are
evaluated positively, then a curve of higher costs results. If only labour has a positive
weight the cost curve is more unfavourable and if management needs labour compensa-
tion in case of higher production the cost curve is located even far higher.
The restriction may also refer to a given desired profit requiring a given difference
between turnover and costs. However, the results do not change fundamentally. The
result of the model is shown graphically in figure 3.
Figure 3: Theory of the public firm
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The second quadrant demonstrates the sales conditions of the public firm. For each vol-
ume of sale a turnover and the referring financial revenues are generated that are used to
cover costs. After deducting fixed costs KA a financial amount is available to finance
variable costs. The so-called output-labour curve illustrates all output labour combina-
tions that can be financed. However to each sales volume only one production volume
X corresponds, therefore only two points on the output-labour curve shown in the sec-
ond quadrant are relevant. One production is material-intensive and the other one is la-
bour-intensive. For alternative turnovers and corresponding production volumes a set of
output-labour curves and a set of relevant material-intensive and labour-intensive points
result. Their connection leads to a frontier of production possibility on the labour-output
curve indicated as a thick curve in this quadrant. Introducing a set of indifference curves27
that correspond to the management utility function (1), the highest indifference curve
that the management can achieve touches the frontier of production possibility output-
labour curve at the point F. This determines the optimal production volume A, the opti-
mal price B and the optimal turnover D. Moreover, there is a path of tangency points
between alternative possibility output-labour curves, which correspond to alternative
demand curves of the public firms. They are related to the cost curves mentioned above.
If the management utility function depends on output only, management maximises
output (II) and the (cost-minimising) cost function results. Utility functions depending
on output and labour (I) lead to paths more to the right of the cost minimal path in the
right hand quadrant. If the public firm is going to maximise labour input (III) then a
path emerges, which connects those tangency points near the respective maximal turn-
over volumes. If the utility function (1) depends on profit and the restriction (2) is not
binding but just a profit definition, then we end up with a maximum profit (IV) solu-
tion along the cost minimal path. In rare cases the owner of public enterprise tries to use
its public firm to raise local revenues (Friedrich, 1998; Friedrich and Feng, 2002). The
respective solution would, in turn, leads to a higher price and a smaller output as the
former solutions. A utility function depending on profit and labour (V) results to a solu-
tion between the profit maximal and the labour maximal price. The related output and
fee solutions are illustrated in figure 3 and figure 4.28
Figure 4: Solutions according to types of management
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The fee level can also be found by the application of investment rules (Friedrich,
1969). In figure 5 different sizes of a charging public firm are shown and resulting cost
curve and the turnover curve are depicted. Because of the positive evaluation of output
(output maximisation or output- and labour-dependent utility maximisation as above)
the intersection of turnover and the cost curve turns out as solution determining output
and price. For a given utility function of management the best solution is located always
to the right, that means the solution which allows higher output. The point and respec-
tive output where the location-oriented cost curves cross is called as the critical output.29
Figure 5: Fees corresponding to different sizes of public enterprise
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Hence we can derive the following rules for user charges of the public enterprise (see
figure 6):
•   if the critical output can be sold at profit that location is the best where the relevant
cost curves shows smaller marginal costs than another one.
•   if the critical output, which is smaller than that at maximal turnover cannot be sold
at profit, the location with the higher marginal costs is the best one.
•   if the critical output, which is bigger than that at maximal turnover cannot be sold at
profit the location with highest marginal turns out the best one.
The solution illustrated in figure 4 can also be applied, if a required absolute profit has
to be achieved. The cost  curves get marked up by the profits and the rules apply to the
resulting curves.
Figure 6: Different fees according to different critical outputs
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The model introduced above is useful as well if there is another decision maker of
higher level such as the owner government, who has a utility preference function con-
cerning the output and the financial means. In a first attempt we consider the owner
government as very powerful principal, e.g. the management of the public firm needs
additional financial means from the owner, the legal form of the public firm guarantees
high competence of the owner government, the municipal right for urban planning, etc.
It is able to command the management of the public firm serving the principal as an
agent. However, it should not loose totally the co-operation of the public firms man-
agement, for this management is needed to realise the location choice. Therefore, the
public management of the firm has to receive a minimum utility to guarantee their will-
ingness to perform.
This approach was applied to determine actions of municipal competition through
municipal enterprises (Friedrich and Feng, 2000). The utility function of the public firm
is again dependent on output and labour. But now a profit F is allowed, which is trans-
ferred to the municipality. The utility function of the municipality shows utility de-
pending on the output of the firm and on the profit transfer. Moreover, minimum utili-
ties are introduced for both players. For a given demand function and a production
function there are combinations of pareto-optimal profit and output level from which a
solution has to be chosen. These combinations lead to combinations of utilities, forming
a utility frontier. The best solution in favour of the powerful principal is where the prin-
cipal receives its maximum utility and the public firm achieves minimum utility.
However, the principal may not be as powerful as mentioned above for various rea-
sons. These can include, for example, (1) dependencies of the local economy on the
services and goods of the municipal firm (in electricity, transportation, water supply,
tourism and culture, etc.) or the knowledge and skills of the management of the public
firm, (2) a favourable relation of the management of the public firm to the management
of a municipal savings bank or mutual political support. Then the players have to nego-
tiate to find a solution including a combination of utilities and of output and profits.
However, there is a consequence of such solutions depending on the location, which
again forms a utility frontier. Out of them a Nash solution can be derived giving the fee
of the public enterprise.
Furthermore models may refer – on the part of the principal – to political goals such
as winning elections or maximising votes. There is a model developed by Sam Pelzman
(1971; 1976) which was extended by Ziemes (1992), in which the principal is interested
in vote maximisation whereas the public firm tries to maximise profits. However, this
model also concerns price policies and tackles price setting in two markets referring to
different voters. Although the profit maximisation is generally restricted for public en-
terprises (Friedrich, 1969; Püttner, 1985; Detig, 2004) some public enterprises (espe-
cially in the industrial sector) try to achieve such goals. We investigate one public en-31
terprise that sells on monopolistic  markets (Feng and Friedrich, 2004). The profit of the
public enterprise increases with price reductions until a profit maximum is reached but
decreases when price cuts follow. This is demonstrated in figure 7 by curves G1 and G2
referring to the different levels of profits. Indifference curves that reflect price combi-
nations are derived. Curve P shows all price combination, which yield the same profit.
Figure 7: Profit indifference curves
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Voters dislike high prices of the public enterprises. Therefore, in figure 6 the curves A1
and A2 result with respect to votes. For votes a curve V is delineated that shows all
price combinations at both markets leading to the same amounts of votes.32
Figure 8: Indifference curves of votes
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Points of tangency between the curves V and P in figure 9 show a path of pareto-
optimal combination of prices ZM for the principal (political interested owner) and the
agent that give maximal profit at given votes or maximal votes at given profit.
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The respective combination of utilities are shown in figure 10 in which vertically the
votes and horizontally the profits are depicted. If a very powerful principal (owner) is
assumed, he determines a low profit (eventually zero) and a maximum of votes in point
Z. If the agent is overwhelming powerful he asks for his maximum profit at point M
leaving the principal with the resulting votes. We can introduce a minimum profit in33
order to ensure the activities of the public enterprises or minimum votes for the princi-
pal necessary to avoid privatisation etc. Again a Nash solution can be achieved at the
point N. In this case the political influence of the owner leads to relatively low prices.
Figure 10: Nash-solution for fees
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We can also combine the expanded Peltzman approach with our model. Then the G
curves are utility curves of the management of the public enterprise if imputation of the
fixed costs to the productions are given. Formally the solutions are the same, but the
management utility is used instead of profits (see figure 11). If there is no predeter-
mined fixed cost imputation, then the P-curve is follows from the fixed costs distribu-
tion which allows the highest utility out of both productions.34
Figure 11: Utility curve of management
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However, if the public enterprises compete against themselves as well, the payoff is
additionally determined by a duopoly solution embedded in the model above (Friedrich,
1988). For one competitor the solution above is determined for a given fee  of the com-
petitor (solution shown in figure 11). Following this assumption a Launhard-Hotelling
solution can be elaborated yielding the payoffs. The solutions of the duopolies and mu-
nicipal competition can also give other results such as employment, prices, outputs,
votes, use of land etc as well. A double – two-level – regional competition among mu-
nicipalities owing public enterprises and charging fees and direct competition among
the fee collecting municipal enterprises can also be modelled. (Friedrich, 1998; Linde-
mann, 1999).
As the horizontal competitive solutions are so difficult to model we may escape to a
different modification of our theory. We base on the principal-agent version of our
model and refer to the monopoly case. But we introduce a competitive situation W of
the municipality and the valuation of the financial target described as F is expressed by
gF(W) – see figure 12. The municipality and the municipal enterprise negotiate about
fixing the financial scope F as well as the Volume X to be produced and the fee P to be
charged. The utility of municipality UG depends on output X (or votes depending on
output) and on its contribution F to the municipal budget (UG=X+gF(W)•F). The utility
of management of the public firm UU depends on output X and employment L. Both
negotiators want to realise, each for itself, a minimum utility level. The situation of the35
firm show production, demand, cost and finance functions. As derived above an area for
possible negotiation solutions referring to financial contribution, the output volume X,
the fee, and the respective utilities of the negotiators, is determined. By application of
bargaining Nash-solution principle a solution is found and the fee is determined (figure
12).
Figure 12: Fees in case of regional competition
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If the financial contribution is of high importance, then gF(W) turns out to be high. If the
competitive pressure W on the municipality is high, it needs high financial contributions
from public firms like casinos, lotteries, trade fair companies, etc. The owner tries to
apply a high price policy mostly against the desire of the public firm. If the municipality36
uses the public enterprise directly for competitive purposes such as the case with real
estate companies, business promotion agencies or in direct infrastructure or industrial
competition such as wineries, farms, manufacturing firms or holiday resorts, sports fa-
cilities, municipal tourist firms etc., a higher W in turn leads to a smaller gF(W). A ten-
dency to a lower financial contribution leads to higher outputs and lower fees.
4.2 Increasing Autonomy through Fees?
The different aims underlying municipal fee policies signal the dependence of fee for-
mation on the various possible goals. Thus various factors determine the level of fees,
such as a welfare function, consumer’s willingness to pay, sales, costs, willingness to
pay in favour or against external effects, such terms concerning the EU, the nation, the
region, a municipality, indicators for success in competition such as market shares, out-
puts, indicators as employment, production, migration, centrality of a municipality,
growth rates, budget sizes, political indicators such as number of votes, shared jobs by
party members, staffing politically important posts, and many indicators to show ad-
ministrative success such as number of beds in hospital, square meters of cleaned roads,
number of pretended cases of crime, school children, and tourists, tons of water supply,
etc. or environmental indicators such as tons of waste, volume of SO2, CO2, etc. There-
fore, according to the various goals quite different fees can result, although in some
countries the benefit principle should be applied. Mostly the benefit principle is inter-
preted as cost coverage principle. However, there are some exceptions, thus the for
some fees this principle is merely a guideline. For example in Germany a profit should
be small and less than 14 % above costs (Rogosch, 1988, Bolsenkötter, 1998). On the
other hand, deficits are allowed or tolerated to achieve environmental, educational or
social aims. Moreover cost coverage implies not a well-defined principle. As munici-
palities have organisational autonomy and the laws concerning fee formation are not
very clear, costs can be defined in different ways, municipalities are able to control
costs within their types of costs accounting, departmental costs accounting or their cost
unit accounting (Friedrich, 1998). Therefore they can allocate their costs according to
their aims to result with high or low fees.
The approaches in positive theory of fixing fees show us that additional factors play a
role. The aims and utility functions of management and owners lead to different fees.
Not only the situations and market forms in vertical and horizontal competition con-
cerning the public firm but also (regional and) municipal competition are relevant.
Apart from pricing policies the fixing of other parameter of actions by administrative
units and public firms can also cause quite different fees. Moreover, types of production
functions, requirements concerning management organisation, factor prices, budget dis-37
tribution systems, taxation, subsidisation, legal forms of public firms or public adminis-
trative units, and local statues and laws determine the fees as well.
Compared to the fiscal situation in which all other modes of finance and the volume
of revenues are given, a budget increase can be achieved when the formation of fees
with respect to providing a fixed amount of services is possible. This also applies even
if the turnover out of fees does not cover cost. However if the municipality can choose
the output of services and provides a higher volume of services as before, the inherent
loss may lead to a shrinking budget. As far as legal requirements force the municipali-
ties just to cover costs their fiscal autonomy can not be significantly improved by col-
lecting fees. As far as they allocate costs adequately in the course of their cost assess-
ment, their fiscal situation may be enhanced by causing hidden profits. If no losses oc-
cur, fiscal autonomy is widened through financing higher volumes of municipal activi-
ties by user charges. Moreover, the fiscal situation of a municipality may be improved
through avoiding losses by appropriate higher fees. When a municipality is able to
achieve reasonable non-maximal profits it can improve its fiscal autonomy. In cases
where municipalities are free to set fees, profit transfers may lead to sustainable im-
provements of fiscal autonomy.
Therefore, municipalities should be careful in selling their public firms or
outsourcing of own production. The basis for fee financing is public property and public
production. In the case of privatisation the benefits from fees are transferred to the pri-
vate sector and it is not guaranteed that private production leads to higher municipal
revenues or even smaller costs. Often, additional tax revenues from private owners are
not expected as those fee collecting institutions are many times treated like private firms
in taxation. They are due to sales taxes and other taxes like business tax, corporate in-
come tax, real estate tax etc. If the municipalities give up their production and sell their
public firms, a control of the local (regional) economy is less effective. Therefore, pol-
icy-making to improve the fiscal autonomy becomes more difficult.
Conclusions
There is a difference in local revenue structure among four investigated countries.
Whereas tax revenues are the most important source of income in Switzerland followed
by fees and charges, grants do play a major role in municipalities of Germany, England
and Poland, but with different shares. Tax revenues are more important in Germany
than in England and of less relevance in Poland. The share of fees and charges only in-
creased in Switzerland in the last decade, while they are negligible in Poland. Municipal
expenditures have gradually increased in all four countries in the last decade. In Ger-38
many expenses for social service are the most important expenditure item, whereas the
expenses for education have been the highest in Switzerland, England and Poland. The
expenditure category social welfare together with health care have recently comprised
approximately 30% of total local expenditures in Germany and Switzerland. For both
countries this reflects a distinctive social system and the rapidly increasing welfare ex-
penditures which could lead to a further local fiscal stress.
In addition the development of municipal public finance during the last decade dem-
onstrates among others that (1) central government interventions with fiscal conse-
quences have intensified, (2) tax reforms disturbed municipal finance, (3) municipalities
tried budget consolidation, and (4) municipalities experienced a reduction in fiscal
autonomy. Furthermore, transformation played a role in Poland and Germany.
Some serious attempts appear to be necessary to protect local governments in order to
ensure their fiscal autonomy. One possibility would be the increase of fees as the local
revenue source. In previous years the issues on fees levied by local governments and
their optimum sum have not been adequately investigated in the public finance. As
shown in the model analyses various factors determine the level of fees, which include a
welfare function, consumer’s willingness to pay, sales, costs, indicators for success in
competition such as market shares, outputs, indicators as employment, production, mi-
gration, growth rates, budget sizes, political indicators such as number of votes, etc.
Therefore, according to the various goals quite different fees can result, although in
some countries the cost coverage principle should be applied.
The approaches in positive theory of fixing fees show that additional factors play a
role. The aims and utility functions of management and owners lead to different fees.
Not only the situations and market structures in vertical and horizontal competition con-
cerning the public firm but also (regional and) municipal competition are relevant.
Apart from pricing policies the fixing of other parameter of actions by administrative
units and public firms can also cause quite different fees. Moreover, types of production
functions, requirements concerning management organisation, factor prices, budget dis-
tribution systems, taxation, subsidisation, legal forms of public firms or public adminis-
trative units, and local statues and laws determine the fees as well.39
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Yearly Classification of Municipal Revenues in Germany (Absolute in million € and Share)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual % actual % actual % actual % Actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Taxes and
similar reve-
nues 38709 38.8 43790 32.8 44577 31.6 44836 31.2 44078 30.4 44066 30.6 44805 31.8 48613 33.6 50970 34.9 52001 35.1
Revenues from
enterprise and
fees 4718 4.7 6270 4.7 6644 4.7 6987 4.9 7036 4.9 7308 5.1 7445 5.3 7697 5.3 7899 5.4 7707 5.2
Received in-
terests 1223 1.2 1576 1.2 1429 1.0 1216 0.8 1144 0.8 1052 0.7 998 0.7 1106 0.8 1041 0.7 1287 0.9
Current grants 46158 46.3 65065 48.7 71814 51.0 75125 52.2 78045 53.9 76777 53.3 72256 51.3 71763 49.6 72830 49.9 75681 51.1
Other current
receipts 15179 15.2 19516 14.6 21082 15.0 22122 15.4 22462 15.5 21627 15.0 20870 14.8 20380 14.1 20005 13.7 19986 13.5
Less those
from other
towns -18633 -18.7 -22093 -16.5 -25513 -18.1 -27434 -19.1 -28645 -19.8 -28357 -19.7 -27018 -19.2 -26870 -18.6 -27464 -18.8 -28558 -19.3
Sale of real
estates 3233 3.2 4492 3.4 5348 3.8 6416 4.5 6273 4.3 6532 4.5 6531 4.6 6637 4.6 6391 4.4 5658 3.8
Property trans-
fer 9184 9.2 14930 11.2 15440 11.0 14066 9.8 14107 9.7 14117 9.8 13546 9.6 13112 9.1 12599 8.6 12239 8.3
Obtain. Capital
service 332 0.3 400 0.3 535 0.4 639 0.4 656 0.5 815 0.6 829 0.6 719 0.5 806 0.6 575 0.4
Participation
on sale 233 0.2 213 0.2 270 0.2 718 0.5 364 0.3 562 0.4 799 0.6 1724 1.2 1090 0.7 1687 1.1
Net new debts 289 0.3 656 0.5 488 0.3 423 0.3 457 0.3 580 0.4 485 0.3 472 0.3 394 0.3 396 0.347
Less borrows
from munici-
palities -840 -0.8 -1114 -0.8 -1221 -0.9 -1182 -0.8 -1174 -0.8 -1151 -0.8 -696 -0.5 -696 -0.5 -636 -0.4 -650 -0.4
Total consoli-
dated receipts 99785 100.0 133700 100.0 140893 100.0 143933 100.0 144802 100.0 143928 100.0 140850 100.0 144657 100.0 145925 100.0 148009 100.0
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a), p. 517, and statistical yearbooks from 1991 on.
Table a2
Yearly Classification of Revenues of Swiss Municipalities (Absolute in million Sfr and Share in %)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Income and property taxes 14763 49.0 17691 46.6 18053 46.7 18142 45.8 17968 45.7 18415 45.7 19394 46.0 20226 46.4
Profits and concessions 70 0.2 117 0.3 99 0.3 99 0.3 119 0.3 122 0.4 138 0.3 125 0.3
Revenues from property 1884 6.3 2547 6.7 2597 6.7 2491 6.3 2618 6.7 2609 6.5 2652 6.3 3000 6.9
Fees 6571 21.8 9526 25.2 9856 25.6 10149 25.7 10173 25.9 10433 25.9 10651 25.3 10797 24.8
?? and unconditioned contri-
butions 1086 3.61 1136 3.0 1120 2.9 1115 2.8 1085 2.8 1168 2.9 1210 2.9 1324 3.0
Grants 4084 13.6 4998 13.2 5005 13.0 5610 14.2 5654 14.4 5805 14.4 6270 14.9 6565 15.1
Receipts for investments 1657 5.5 1813 4.8 1776 4.6 1853 4.7 1615 4.1 1660 4.1 1740 4.1 1567 3.6
Total (in million Sfr) 30115 100.0 37828 100.0 38506 100.0 39459 100.0 39232 100.0 40212 100.0 42055 100.0 43604 100.0
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2003), p. 800.48
Table a3
Yearly Classification of Local Authority Income in England (Absolute in million GBP and Share)*
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002
Actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Revenues from
local taxes (a) 22530 38.4 20912 32.2 21756 31.4 20392 29.5 19844 27.7 21042 28.6 23102 30.6 23170 30.0 24759 30.4 26987 31.8 29699 33.0 30440 31.1
Local fees and
charges (b) 12340 21.0 13514 20.8 13983 20.2 13191 19.1 13934 19.4 13611 18.5 14180 18.8 14923 19.3 16245 20.0 16892 19.9 17043 19.0 18553 19.0
Non-tax





Tax Sharing (d) 21437 36.5 28868 44.4 32585 47.0 34575 50.0 37012 51.6 36919 50.2 35897 47.5 36712 47.6 37234 45.7 37285 44.0 38283 42.6 44436 45.4
Bank credits &
municipal bonds
(e) -507 -0.9 529 0.8 557 0.8 1160 1.7 155 0.2 1115 1.5 1570 2.1 931 1.2 931 1.1 136 0.2 1937 2.2 863 0.9
less (f) -1703 -2.9 -2243 -3.5 -2644 -3.8 -4302 -6.2 -2529 -3.5 -2137 -2.9 -2337 -3.1 -2057 -2.7 -1875 -2.3 -1509 -1.8 -2208 -2.5 -1751 -1.8
Total Amount of
Total Revenues 58685 100.0 64977 100.0 69351 100.0 69102 100.0 71707 100.0 73568 100.0 75596 100.0 77210 100.0 81431 100.0 84804** 100.0 89923** 100.0 97794 100.0
*All figures in British Pounds, Millions. According to Table 2.1, Local Government Financial Statistics England 2000, these figures incorporate Total Revenue Income as well as Total Capital Income.
** Overhanging debt on housing sold, repaid by ODPM is not included in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001.
a)  Includes council taxes, national non-domestic rates, council tax benefit grant, council tax transitional reduction scheme grant and since 1998/99 city offset.
b)  Includes fees, charges and other income from General Fund Account, rents and other income from Housing Revenue Account, as well as fees, charges and other income from the External Trading
Services Revenue Accounts.
c)  Includes all external interest receipts, as well as non-governmental grants, contributions and capital receipts from Capital Account. Note: Grants, contributions and Capital receipts from disposals
of fixed assets, leasing disposals, repayments. etc. have a one-time only revenue character.
d)  Includes revenue support grants to Local Authorities, Community charge grant, SSA reduction grant, specific and special (since 1998/99: central support protection grant and police grant)
government grants, government subsidies and grants from Housing Revenue Account and grants used for debt redemption. Tax sharing also included.
e)  Includes external income, notional borrowing, increase in borrowing, commutation of specific loan charges, net change in capital creditors and accruals adjustment to reflect the correct year.
Note:   Accruals adjustment for 1990/1 was negative, hence the negative value of Bank Credits and municipal bonds.
f)  Less indicates recharges to other accounts, receipts to local authorities, housing benefit transfers from other revenue account.
Source: UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2003) and former years.49
Table a4
Yearly Classification of Municipal Income in Poland (Absolute in million Zlotys and Share)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Revenues from local taxes (a) 19.0 18.6 16.2 16.7 13.8 13.5 13.4 12.2 12.8 15.2 18.7
Local fees and charges (b) 3.5 3.3 2.8 3.0 6.1 6.3 4.2 4.4 4.0 1.6 1.6
Non-tax revenues (c) n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.1 4.3 4.3
Intergovernmental transfers, spe-
cific grants and Revenues from Tax
Sharing (d) 52.7 53.5 59.7 58.9 64.7 63.9 65.8 54.0 54.8 54.7 63.6
Other own revenues (e) 24.8 24.5 21.3 21.4 9.7 10.3 10.2 22.5 21.3 24.2 11.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total amount of revenues in million
Zlotys* 6440 9649 14808 19993 30956 39518 46119 32354 34584 37287 38474
*Note: Years 1990 to 1991 not included due to the lack of proper data.
a)  Includes Tax on real estate and agricultural tax.
b)  Includes Transportation charges and revenue from treasury fee.
c)  Includes revenue form sale of property i.e. one time revenue character. 1992-1995: data on non-tax revenues not available.
d)  Includes shares in income taxes to State budget revenue, allocations and general subsidies from State budget revenue.
e)  Due to the lack of more exact data nothing more can be said about these revenues.
Source: Polish Official Statistics, Regional Data Bank, http://www.stat.gov.pl.50
Table a5
Yearly Classification of Municipal Expenditures in Germany (Absolute in million € and Share)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Organisation and
Management 12121 9.0 13016 8.5 13083 8.1 13039 8.0 13370 8.1 13365 8.2 13191 8.2 13420 8.3 13873 8.5 14031 8.5
Security 4952 3.7 5792 3.8 6258 3.9 6358 3.9 6696 4.0 6757 4.1 6849 4.3 6980 4.3 7188 4.4 7385 4.5
Schools 12349 9.2 12825 8.4 13167 8.2 13123 8.0 13528 8.1 13376 8.2 13307 8.3 13340 8.3 13343 8.1 13456 8.2
Science and
Research 5117 3.8 5812 3.8 5859 3.6 5641 3.5 5733 3.5 5692 3.5 5668 3.5 5782 3.6 5945 3.6 6143 3.7
Social Welfare 33043 24.6 38850 25.5 43396 27.0 46481 28.4 48337 29.1 46618 28.6 43285 27.1 42954 26.6 43230 26.4 43958 26.7
Health, Sports.
Leisure 6220 4.6 8362 5.5 8195 5.1 8051 4.9 7876 4.7 7540 4.6 7309 4.6 7212 4.5 7253 4.4 7485 4.5
Construction,
Housing and
Traffic 18976 14.1 20277 13.3 20081 12.5 19836 12.1 19405 11.7 18971 11.6 18619 11.6 18511 11.5 19240 11.7 19499 11.8
Public Facilities,
Business Pro-
motion 16992 12.6 20100 13.2 19778 12.3 19341 11.8 19249 11.6 18423 11.3 17940 11.2 16846 10.4 16428 10.0 16705 10.1
Municipal
Firms,  Real
Estate Funds 8747 6.5 9852 6.5 9871 6.1 9685 5.9 9339 5.6 8646 5.3 8603 5.4 8568 5.3 8865 5.4 8917 5.4
Finance 15942 11.9 17424 11.4 20914 13.0 21898 13.4 22506 13.6 23515 14.4 25181 15.7 27730 17.2 28408 17.3 27340 16.6
Total 134457 100.0 152309 100.0 160603 100.0 163456 100.0 166038 100.0 162902 100.0 159952 100.0 161343 100.0 163774 100.0 164919 100.0
All figures include special financial operations.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b), p. 12.51
Table a6
Yearly Classification of Expenditures of Swiss Municipalities (Absolute in million Sfr and Share)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Organisation and
management 2873 9.5 3351 8.8 3373 8.8 3282 8.5 3335 8.7 3395 8.6 3361 8.5 3417 8.4
Justice, police, fire
protection 1360 4.5 1768 4.7 1799 4.7 1789 4.6 1792 4.7 1809 4.6 1783 4.5 1834 4.5
Defence 560 1.9 429 1.1 380 1.0 353 0.9 302 0.8 281 0.7 260 0.7 249 0.6
Education 6673 22.1 8497 22.4 8769 22.8 8886 23.0 8924 23.2 9043 23.0 9028 22.7 9283 22.9
Culture and leisure 1988 6.6 2072 5.5 2038 5.3 2045 5.3 1994 5.2 2094 5.3 2062 5.2 2158 5.3
Health 4826 16.0 6772 17.9 6903 18.0 6923 17.9 6922 18.0 7035 17.9 7260 18.3 7393 18.2
Social welfare 3365 11.1 4776 12.6 4989 13.0 5206 13.5 5346 13.9 5592 14.2 5878 14.8 6013 14.8
Traffic 2642 8.7 2980 7.9 2945 7.7 2940 7.6 2873 7.5 2787 7.1 2921 7.4 2913 7.2
Environment and
regional planning 2782 9.2 3345 8.8 3288 8.6 3406 8.8 3378 8.8 3529 9.0 3485 8.8 3530 8.7
Economics 1022 3.4 907 2.4 837 2.2 800 2.1 621 1.6 700 1.8 707 1.8 850 2.1
Finance and taxation 2154 7.1 2976 7.9 3107 8.1 3066 7.9 2982 7.8 3062 7.8 2969 7.5 2958 7.3
Total 30245 100.0 37873 100.0 38428 100.0 38696 100.0 38469 100.0 39327 100.0 39714 100.0 40599 100.0
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2003), p. 806.52
Table a7
Yearly Classification of Total Local Authority Expenditure in England (Absolute in million GBP and Share)
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Education 20581 34.5 23508 36.3 25421 36.8 22691 33.0 22791 31.9 22759 30.9 23185 30.7 23722 30.7 25018 30.7 25692 30.3 28057 31.1 30903 31.6
Personal social
services 5474 9.2 6077 9.4 6422 9.3 7269 10.6 8607 12.0 9623 13.1 10610 14.0 11362 14.7 12392 15.2 13711 16.2 14713 16.3 15110 15.5
Transport 4665 7.8 4692 7.3 4871 7.1 4733 6.9 4949 6.9 4854 6.6 4621 6.1 4571 5.9 4734 5.8 4867 5.7 5618 6.2 6437 6.6




Dept. Services 794 1.3 882 1.4 883 1.3 962 1.4 929 1.3 992 1.3 962 1.3 963 1.2 1202 1.5 1273 1.5 1245 1.4 1350 1.4
Housing 9872 16.5 10235 15.8 11322 16.4 12664 18.4 13120 18.4 13603 18.5 13793 18.2 13368 17.3 13689 16.8 13860 16.3 14697 16.3 14297 14.6
Libraries and
Art Galleries 829 1.4 889 1.4 904 1.3 918 1.3 944 1.3 902 1.2 953 1.3 972 1.3 1202 1.5 1521 1.8 1634 1.8 1772 1.8
Sports and
Recreation 2160 3.6 1229 (b) 1.9 1042 1.5 972 1.4 1002 1.4 1091 1.5 1066 1.4 1043 1.4 1105 1.4 1146 1.4 1284 1.4 1392 1.4
Local Envi-
ronmental
Services 9036 15.1 10172 (b) 15.7 10568 15.3 10686 15.5 10955 15.3 5552 7.5 6132 8.1 6360 8.2 6658 8.2 7097 8.4 7530 8.4 8166 8.4
Other Services
(a) 270 0.5 304 0.5 297 0.4 281 0.4 279 0.4 6187 8.4 5928 7.8 6219 8.1 6455 7.9 6249 7.4 5555 6.2 7828 8.0
Total 59720 100.0 64701 100.0 69020 100.0 68723 100.0 71481 100.0 73567 100.0 75593 100.0 77210 100.0 81428 100.0 84824 100.0 90179 100.0 97793 100.0
a) Included till 1994/95 agriculture and fisheries and include since 1995/96 supported employment services, flood defence, coast protection, other agriculture, consumer protection, corporate and
democratic core, administration and support services and miscellaneous services.
b) Expenditure on parks and open spaces has been re-allocated to local environmental services.
Source: UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister from 1993 on and calculation of the ifo Institute for Economic Research.53
Table a8
Total Municipal Expenditures by Year in Poland (Absolute in million Zlotys and Share)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture and Hunting 22.0 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.6
Transport and telecommunica-
tion services 1.9 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 6.2 6.5 12.2 11.1
Communal Economy 20.6 30.9 27.7 29.7 23.0 22.6 22.9 17.0 16.0 9.6 9.6
Dwelling Economy 6.2 8.1 6.9 5.3 4.3 4.7 4.8 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.9
Education 14.7 20.9 26.4 26.0 38.7 37.7 37.2 40.6 42.7 41.0 41.6
Culture. etc. 2.8 3.7 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2
Healthcare** 6.3 6.3 6.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
Welfare 13.7
17.9 19.2 18.9
9.5 9.7 9.8 10.7 10.6 11.9 12.2
Sport. Physical Education 9.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0
Public Administration 8.8 11.9 10.7 11.1 10.0 9.9 9.9 12.4 12.4 13.5 13.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Expenditures* 6488 9583 14904 19828 31499 40504 47495 32835 36211 38568 39548
Note: Data starts with 1993 due to lack of complete data for 1990 - 1992.
* Total Expenditures include operating costs and investments.
** For the data sets in years 1993, 1994 and 1995 Healthcare and Welfare were classified together under the same category.
Source: Polish Official Statistics, Regional Data Bank, http://www.stat.gov.pl.